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Abstract
The sovereignty of the European nation states in the realm of security politics is gradu-
ally eroding. At the same time the European integration to a large degree influences the 
level of direct bilateral police cooperation, since cross-border crime has come to be per-
ceived not as only a national, but as a common problem for the European nation states. 
At the German-Polish border, “Europe’s Rio Grande“, these high expectations concern-
ing security policy are put into practice. With Poland’s EU accession, Polish and Ger-
man border guards are no longer spatially separated, but jointly control travellers. Joint 
patrols and contact points have already existed since 1998. 
On the one hand the, enforced meeting of German and Polish border policemen may 
help dismantle mutual prejudices. On the other hand, other cleavages may appear, based 
on cultural, systemic and institutional factors, which hinder the development of mutual 
trust and reinforce the asymmetrical relationship between the Schengen-member Ger-
many and the “junior partner” Poland.
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Unequal Partners.
Security and Identity at the 
Polish-German Border
From the point of view of the nation state the national border is a sensitive area (for an 
overview on border studies s. Donnan/Wilson 1999). It serves as a filter to prevent the 
influx of crime into the state´s territory. Border polices are the institutions in charge 
here. A border guard is the first representative of the nation state, and he therefore em-
bodies the legitimate state order. He is the living symbol that one sovereign territory 
ends and another one begins. Police and border police as well are taken to be a “special-
ized body of people given the primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safe-
guard security” (Reiner 2000: 7). The ones who take care of security inside a nation 
state should ideally be assigned to and trained for by that nation state exclusively.
1
The idea of international police cooperation is in conflict with this claim. Euro-
pean integration, the Schengen Agreements, and the creation of a new “security field” 
(cf. Bigo 2000) in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, 
the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the migration pressure on Europe have 
brought the European nation states to increased police cooperation. This effort is based 
on the underlying assumption that freedom inside the community can only be accom-
plished and maintained through security. Freedom and security thus directly depend on 
the successful fight against cross-border crime (cf. Walter 2003). This new security field 
is necessarily of an expansionist nature, “because of pressure to present a common front 
to the outside world” (Anderson 2002: 39). In general, the tendency can be observed 
that internal and external security mechanisms are being shifted from the nation state to 
international organisations.
2 But even though there is a trend towards globalisation and 
Europeanisation of police activity, most cross-border cooperation takes place in bilateral 
agreements, and very often informally. 
In the following I am going to examine the question why one nation state should 
grant insight into a part of its foremost domain, national security, to another nation state. 
I will ask what conditions have to be met for nation states to engage in police coopera-
tion. Subsequently I will apply these theses to the German-Polish border police coopera-
1 In practice state security organs tend to be supplemented and substituted by private security services (cf. 
Johnston 2000).
2 The Tampere and Hague Programmes have been a break-through for European security policy in this 
respect, since the Council recognized the necessity that internal and external security mechanism, civil 
and  military  instruments,  need  to  be  coordinated  across  the  three  EU  pillars  (Kommission  der  Eu-
ropäischen Gemeinschaften 2004; 2005).Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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tion of Bundespolizei (BPOL)
3DQG6WUDĪ*UDQLF]QD6*DQGZLOOVKRZWKHVSHFLILFLW\
and problematic nature of this kind of cooperation on the organisational local meso 
level and on the micro level of personal interaction.
4 In this case Germany and the 
Schengen countries face the “junior partner” Poland who does not yet apply entirely the 
Schengen acquis. Their relationship is marked by dependency and asymmetry.
Why police cooperation?
Nation states are rather reluctant to share their sovereignty in the realm of security. Po-
lice cooperation always entails insight into sensitive fields and data, data that nation 
states cannot be expected to disclose open-heartedly. The securing of the territory, the 
maintenance of public order, the fight against crime and the choice of appropriate means 
to accomplish these aims are first and foremost domains of the nation state. Last, but not 
least they serve as a means to self-preservation (cf. Weber 2005 [1921]: 660). Police 
cooperation is thus not only functional but reflects as well the countries’ attitudes to-
wards themselves and the world. This on the other hand corresponds to the widespread 
tendency that politics and citizens tend to place confidence rather in their own police 
(and their own judicial system) than in that of another nation state.
Even though citizens have become familiar with transnational kinds of police ac-
tivity especially in the field of criminal investigations, like Interpol and Europol, these 
are not a matter of course. If it is assumed that police and similar services are genuine 
institutions of nation states that claim and protect their sovereignty with high efforts, 
then these nation states will not be inclined to share this sovereignty and grant insight to 
foreign institutions: “Cooperation among public police institutions at an international 
level,  therefore,  seems  to  be  inherently  paradoxical  to  their  nation-bound  function, 
acutely  posing  the  question  of  why  police  nonetheless  cooperate  across  national 
boundaries” (Deflem 2000: 741). It appears therefore contradictory that police coopera-
tion is most relevant in those fields which draw on the most intimate needs of the state 
and  which  should  be  most  protected  from  outside  influence.  In  particular  the  fight 
against terrorism in the 1970s showed that states are more willing to subordinate their 
sovereignty when they fear a threat towards the existence of the state and the social or-
der. Although the fight against different kinds of terrorism has not always had a promi-
nent place on the agenda of international police cooperation,
5 there is still a consistent 
3 The German Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) was renamed Bundespolizei (Federal Police) on July 1st 2005 in 
order to express the extended field of activity. “Bundesgrenzschutz” in this text refers explicitly to events 
before the renaming. For current developments and scope of duties s. Möllers et al. 2003.
4 This article is based on fieldwork conducted at the German-Polish border in 2004/2005. Thanks to the 
permissions from both German and Polish border police headquarters I was able to do participant obser-
vation at several control posts, the “Green Border” and a German training centre, and to conduct in-depth 
interviews with Polish and German border policemen. I interviewed thirteen Polish and ten German bor-
der guards in their native languages, among them five women, a number which might even overrepresent 
the number of women in border police. Quotes without explicit reference are excerpts from my fieldwork. 
This paper is part of my PhD project and therefore it is work in progress; comments are of course wel-
come.
5 Interpol for a long time failed to deal with this topic adequately, and the Trevi group established in 1975 
can be taken as a European answer to this failure (cf. Busch 1995, Ch. 5.3.2). Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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thread throughout history. While Busch argues that the debate on terrorism since the 
1970s has strikingly resembled the discussion on anarchism and the subsequent begin-
ning of police cooperation in the 19th century (Busch 1995: 285), the western commu-
nity is now moving closer together in the face of Islamic bombers. While back then, 
police cooperation was viewed as an expression of solidarity it has come to be perceived 
as a means of self-defence. However, a stable and institutionalised European police co-
operation could in the long run bring about a change in the role of the nation state in the 
field of European security (Anderson et al. 1995: 1). This tendency is not only visible in 
the field of international, but also border police cooperation.
German-Polish cooperation at the Odra
The German-Polish cooperation has taken on a role as a trailblazer for European border 
police cooperation.
6 The German-Polish Agreement from 18
th of February 2002 (Gesetz 
zu dem Abkommen vom 18. Februar 2002) fixed the basis of the cooperation which had 
already been established years before. These instructions are put into action on the sub-
ordinate levels of the organisations. On the German side these are the Bundespolizeiäm-
ter (BPOLA), with the subordinate Bundspolizeiinspektionen (BPOLI), on the Polish 
SDUWWKH2GG]LDáDQG*UDQLF]QD3ODFyZND.RQWUROL*3.DUHLQFKDUJH&RQWDFWDQG
cooperation are not mediated by an inter-state organisation on the European level, but 
work binationally and, on the meso level of BPOL-Ämter and SG-2GG]LDáHDUHQHJRWi-
ated by local experts. Qualified personnel cooperate whose impetus was not primarily 
binational or European, but was concerned with the securing of their own national bor-
der. German-Polish border police cooperation can roughly be divided into three steps: 
In 1998 for the first time German-Polish border patrols were introduced. Since at 
the time the border was the last obstacle for illegal migrants from the East to enter the 
European Union, the patrols were held to be an adequate means to prevent that migra-
tion. The “joint arrest” is not only meant to facilitate the work of the border police, but 
it has an important signalling function for the common action of both Poles and Ger-
mans. Meanwhile even the carrying of arms has become possible during the patrols on 
the other side of the river, which from the point of view of sovereignty is an extraordi-
nary achievement. 
Likewise in 1998 the German-Polish contact point (Kota) at the city bridge in
Frankfurt (Oder) was created. Here German and Polish border police coordinate joint 
actions and shortcut official channels. When earlier it took several weeks for the Ger-
mans to find out the owner of a Polish car, with the request going from Frankfurt (Oder) 
via Berlin to Warsaw and the same way back, it now takes them at most one hour to 
find out.
The last important step towards closer cooperation occurred with Poland’s ad-
mission to the European Union. Since 1
st of May 2004 the border policemen have no 
longer been the sole masters of their control boxes. In the course of a more efficient 
fight against crime and traffic jams the “One-Stop-Control” was introduced. Poles and 
6 Joint patrols at the German-Czech border only started in 2003 with explicit reference to the good experi-
ence gained at the German-Polish border (cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2004: 14).Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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Germans no longer stand separately from each other but work together in one control 
box and jointly control travel documents. Bilateral agreements explicitly fixed the mode 
of the control. Thus it is clearly regulated that also in the One-Stop-Control the leaving 
country controls prior to the entering country. The basic structure of the control as well 
as the duties in the case of arrest have not changed. The achievements of the One-Stop-
Control are most obvious in the reduction of traffic jams at the border, making the 
crossing of the border more comfortable to the traveller. However, full cooperation has 
not yet been accomplished since the institutional structures are still strictly separated. 
The different computer systems might serve as an example how little the actual work 
has in common. Employees of BPOL use the German search system INPOL and the 
Schengen Information System SIS, Poland on the other hand has only the Polish na-
tional search system at its disposal. This strict division will only diminish when Poland 
will fully implement the Schengen Agreement.
Border Police Cooperation
Police cooperation, in particular in the field of information exchange, has taken place 
since the end of the 19th century (cf. Busch 1995: ch. 5.1.1.; Deflem 1996). Transna-
tional police cooperation can be divided into two types: (1) national or subnational insti-
tutions cooperating with the respective organisations of other nation states. This kind of 
cooperation is genuinely cross-border and most widespread. However, it might be asked 
if this kind of international cooperation can indeed be considered transnational; (2) po-
lice activity through genuinely supranational institutions which differ from the former 
as “they have tended to engage in the collection, collation and dissemination of intelli-
gence rather than in operational policing proper” (Johnston 2000: 22). Examples might 
be Interpol, Europol or the Trevi-Group. This is accompanied by the division into stra-
tegic “knowledge workers” (Sheptycki 2002) and proactive police work on the one hand 
and reactive “street cops” on the other hand.
In contrast to organisations like Europol and Interpol, the level of border police 
cooperation of different countries is not supranational, but, in most cases, bilateral and 
set down in international treaties. Direct cooperation appears to be the most efficient 
way in order not to complicate actions and in order to make use of local experts’ experi-
ence.
Secondly,  the  cooperation  does  not  rest  on  specially  educated  and  skilled 
“knowledge workers” who in “intelligence units”
7 almost exclusively engage in strate-
gic international police work. In the case at issue the opposite way is chosen and the 
operative field of activity of national police is expanded by an international dimension. 
Another difference is that cross-border bilateral cooperation in most cases arises from 
and reflects the specific situation of the border region itself: “The problems which the 
various police agencies seek to address in these circumstances are a reflection of the 
cross-border life of certain regions […]. Such police problems that there are in these
7 “Intelligence-led policing […] can be roughly defined as a collection of investigation techniques, which 
allows the pro-active or preventive search for cues, eventually culminating in a synthesised picture of a 
crime to be committed. As such, ‘intelligence’ can be contrasted with reactive or repressive information-
gathering, which is usually performed after a crime has already been perpetrated” (Den Boer 2002: 151).Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
7
regions are restricted to specific zones, there is no ‘strategic depth’ to this police activ-
ity” (Bigo 2000: 69). Border police certainly has to deal with phenomena of transna-
tional crime, but their operative measures are restricted to the local level. Border police 
in general is occupied with “cross-border crimes”, crime across one or more borders. 
This is to be distinguished from “border crimes”, crime that is organised along national 
borders and that profits from their existence, like drug-dealing in border towns, but 
which does not entail a border crossing per se (cf. Anderson et al. 1995: 13f). Even 
though BPOL can take up police activity in the border region, “border crimes” in the 
first place are left to the local police.
There are only a few exceptions which allow police officers, and border police, to act on 
the territory of another nation state. A police officer normally cannot officially take ac-
tion on the territory of another country if the latter has not given its consent beforehand. 
Otherwise he would be perceived as violating this state’s sovereignty and might trigger 
diplomatic disputes (cf. Brammertz 1999: 2). In order to gather information relevant for 
investigation the police in general are dependent on time-consuming assistance in law 
enforcement. Likewise, carrying the service weapon on foreign territory is normally not 
permitted. The cooperation, however, provides an important means to these juridical 
and institutional obstacles in order to simplify the procedures, since “cross-border cri-
mes” have come to be perceived as not only a national, but a common problem for the 
European area of freedom, security and justice. 
Conditions and Motives for Cooperation
For  successful  police  cooperation  more  than  goodwill  and  a  political  resolution  are 
needed. To clarify the basis required I want to draw on Mathieu Deflem who has pro-
vided a detailed account of the historic origins of international police cooperation. With 
reference to Max Weber’s theory on bureaucracy he designs a model of international 
police cooperation which differentiates between structural conditions and operational 
motives (cf. Deflem 2000; Weber 2005 [1921]).
(1) Structural conditions enable national polices to become active outside the 
borders of their national legislation. Therefore they have to be specialised bureaucracies 
that have reached a sufficient degree of independence from their respective govern-
ments. This allows them to act semi-autonomously: “policing takes forms which go 
beyond explicit government instructions” (Anderson et al. 1995: 4). Moreover, only 
similar structural positions inside the state between polices of different countries create 
the basis for cooperation, “as the police recognize one another as fellow professionals, 
rather  than  as  diverse  nationals”  (Deflem  2002:  457).  The  opportunity  of  semi-
autonomous action does not only appear in cooperation, it often is the prerequisite for 
its creation. As Deflem points out, successful police cooperation has always been initi-
ated by local experts from the respective institutions before it was legally fixed.
8
(2) International police cooperation, however, can only function properly when 
additional  motives  come  into  play,  and  when  police  institutions  share  a  “system  of 
8 Cf. Sheptycki 2002, ch. 1 for a detailed account on the development of police cooperation in the Chan-
nel region. Local networks and informal contacts became institutionalised and formalised with growing 
interest from the part of the national governments.Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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knowledge” about international crime. Professional interest in the control and the fight 
of international crime is needed on the part of all sides involved. Here Deflem refers to 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), who perceive operational rules in bureaucratic organisations 
as “myths” that define problems and accompanying solutions in concepts framed for 
and by the bureaucracy. Together with the efficiency of the organisation these myths 
influence the organisation’s legitimacy, activity and resources while minimising exter-
nal insight and control. In this way the institution gains legitimacy by showing that its 
own rules and practices are the sole answer to a problem it itself has formulated (cf. 
Douglas 1986). Even under favourable structural conditions police cooperation will not 
be successful if no common myth, the image of crime to be fought, is shared (Deflem 
2000: 746). 
Structural Conditions – Germany and Poland
Poland’s integration into Europe and the Atlantic security system has been going on 
since the systemic transformation in 1990. The fall of the Iron Curtain has not only ex-
tended the field of activities for cross-border crime in, to and from Eastern Europe, but 
also new possibilities for cooperation of executive institutions in East and West have 
arisen (Anderson et al. 1995: 156).
Due to the systemic antagonisms, the structural conditions for police cooperation 
between East and West, the FRG and state-socialist Poland did not exist before the sys-
tem transformation. Because of the political circumstances which were similar in Po-
land, the communist satellite states and the Soviet Union itself, the predecessor of the 
SG
9 could not reach institutional independence which would have allowed for autono-
mous international action (cf. Deflem 2002: 472). Secondly, border police cooperation 
could not take place because the countries shared no international border. 
Border guards from GDR and state-socialist Poland, however, cultivated an in-
tense exchange both socially and officially, as they regularly held joint exercises. The 
climate between the Polish border troops and the soviet Red Army then stationed at the 
border was, however, less favourable but instead characterized by deep mistrust. Hence, 
ideological proximity does not automatically entail successful cooperation.
Only the fall of the Iron Curtain and the prospect of Poland’s accession to the 
European Union provided the framework for German-Polish border police cooperation 
to emerge. This cooperation did not only begin long before Poland joined the EU, but it 
even then had a pioneering position. On the basis of favourable structural conditions 
(relative independence, Poland’s EU integration) experts from inside the organisations 
had initiated the cooperation on the level of Bundesgrenzschutzämter (BGSA) and SG-
2GG]LDáHEHIRUHLWEHFDPHOHJDOO\IL[HG7KHLGHDRIMRLQWSDWUROVZDVILUVWSURSRVHGE\
the BGSA Frankfurt (Oder); they were started and put to the test on the basis of local 
DJUHHPHQWVZLWK3ROLVK2GG]LDáHEHIRUHWKH*HUPDQ-Polish agreement on the coopera-
tion of police and border police created  a  generally binding legal basis. Brammertz 
(1999: 4) has argued for the police cooperation in the Euregio Maas-Rhein that the ex-
isting legal basis did not match the new realities, and that their interpretation often led 
9 ”Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza“ (WOP)Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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the police to operate in legal grey areas. Anderson et al. (1995: 75) also mention that 
German senior officers fear that the necessary formalization of agreements for police 
cooperation in the course of the Schengen implementation process might endanger effi-
cient informal arrangements which are essential for cooperation in the border regions. 
Border police cooperation generally takes place below the sphere of politics. As 
semi-autonomous institutions the border police organizations remain untouched by any 
tensions in German-Polish relations, hence political differences between governments 
are subordinate to police-professional forms and derived concepts (Busch 1995: 258). 
Cooperation only becomes problematic when agreements are to be made on the political 
level on which local experts can exert few influence.
Operational Motives
German-Polish cooperation is motivated by the joint interest to prevent cross-border
crime. The common myth, or enemy, is trafficking in human beings, illegal entry, theft 
and forgery of documents. The institutions involved share a “system of knowledge” on 
these crimes and are aware that these can be fought much more efficiently in team work 
than only in the national frame. 
It is part of this myth that a virtually natural connection between the degree of 
intensity of the border regime and crime statistics is assumed. Judging from the present 
internal Schengen borders, the dismantling of the internal stationary border controls did 
not necessarily entail a decline in police activity.
10 A connection between the relaxation 
of borders and a growth in crime could not yet be proven (cf. Anderson et al. 1995: 
16ff; Walker 1998: 172). Police and other security services on the contrary took the 
opportunity to extend their mandate, resources and equipment. The powers of police 
and border police and the technical means in terms of equipment and innovations like 
the  biometric  passport  are  constantly  growing  (cf.  Council  of  the  European  Union 
2004b).
11
In this sense European police cooperation on the one hand is an example for the 
discourse on “functional spillover”, the necessity that one intervention into a policy sec-
tor requires adjustments in neighbouring policy fields: “The argument about the need 
for security measures to compensate for the opening of internal frontiers […] serves to 
demonstrate how the logic of functionalism is generally favourable to enhanced police 
co-operation” (Walker 1998: 171). Police measures are quickly at hand to compensate 
for dysfunctions in another sector. One side effect is the possibility of limited civil 
rights.  The  Eastern  Enlargement  of  the  European  Union  and  the  hype  on  increased 
criminal networks is just one example where in the eyes of scared citizens, border con-
trols and police cooperation are to repair what politics created. Complex political prob-
lems are being reduced to an alleged security deficit that is eagerly believed. On the 
10 Even the first plans for the relaxation of border controls in the Saarbrücken Agreement of 13.7.1984 
contained precautionary compensation measures as it was presumed that the relaxation of the border con-
trols and their transfer to the external border would entail a rise in crime (cf. Busch 1995: 24f).
11 For development and importance of technological progress in international police cooperation (s. De-
flem 2002).Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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other hand this development entails far-reaching implications for the construction of a 
common “European home”, an issue that will be addressed in the following section.
The foremost interest in the fight of crime can be differentiated for the nation 
states involved. The national factor should not be disregarded. Police activity on an in-
ternational level has to be connected to the national context to gain legitimacy: ”interna-
tional police duties are mostly conceived as explicit components of the national function 
of police to enforce the ‘laws of the land’” (Deflem 2004: 94 [emphasis in original]). As 
polices embody the state monopoly, force actions on international police level are al-
ways subordinated to the national interests and shall not contradict them.
Operational Motives –Germany and the Schengen countries
Germany has played a major role in the preparations for the Schengen Agreements and 
Europol and massively supported the extension of police powers. This on the one hand 
can be explained by Germany’s central position inside Europe, and on the other hand 
many authors see these efforts rooted in German mentality: ”it also flows from the gen-
eral rejection within German police culture of amateurism and ad hoc arrangements for 
fighting crime” (cf. Anderson et al. 1995: 48 [emphasis in original]).
The fight against cross-border crime, hence, does not only serve the internal pro-
tection but embodies the national idea, the concept of a community of people who share 
a feeling of belonging
12, and who have understood the “rules of the game” (Heyman 
1999: 619), in the first place laws, and abide by them. This discourse now does not only 
refer to the national state but extends to the member states of the European Union, espe-
cially to those of the Schengen Agreements. While on the one hand, the discussion on 
the desperate search for a European Identity focuses mostly on the democratic deficit of 
the EU and the alienation of citizens from the EU, on the other hand a clear connection 
between the discourse on European Identity, home security and increased cooperation in 
the realm of justice and home affairs can be observed (cf. Walker 1998). 
The search for European commonalities revolves around ideal constructions of a 
presumed common ground of values for all European nations (“Core Values”): Jewish-
Christian heritage, Enlightenment, the French Revolution, in short, a list that could be 
arbitrarily continued and that recurs to some alleged superiority of the “West” (cf. Da-
vies 1996; Hedetoft 1997; Delanty 1999). On the other hand the concept of Europe has
always been most concise where it was not defined out of itself, but in contrast to some-
thing else. After the end of the Cold War old enemies could not be used anymore to 
construct a (West-)European identity, “after 1989 Europe was open to new definitions” 
(Delanty 1995: 142). Europe as a security community has a much more tangible mean-
ing and finds much larger support than the so far anaemic concept of a cultural identity.
It is much easier to define what Europe is not. It is not Asia, and it is not the Is-
lamic world. Above all it is not the poor neighbours who come to the West for happi-
ness and welfare, and whose intrusion has to be prevented in order to preserve economic 
prosperity. The cherished antagonism of East and West has outlived its usefulness and 
has been replaced by a new external threat: “mass immigration, organized crime, and 
12 Cf. Benedict Anderson’s (1998) concept of “Imagined Communities”.Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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imported terrorism, the penetration of which would, like the old threat, lead to the de-
stabilization of ‘well-balanced’ western societies” (Anderson et al. 1995: 165).
Illegality  in  this  sense  is  an  external  phenomenon,  and  its  intrusion  into  the 
community has to be prevented: “Interdiction is the quintessential expression of the na-
tional idea; drawing a strict limit around the body politic, it characterizes goods and 
people arriving at the border as potential contaminants to be kept out or inspected and 
allowed in under certain conditions” (Heyman 1999: 621). Migrants and asylum-seekers 
are redefined as security problems for the European nation states. Coloured migrants in
particular face prejudices that associate them with drugs, fraud of social welfare benefits 
and deviance while occupying the workplaces of the locals, having a much too high 
birth rate and generally bankrupting the whole welfare system.
The possibility to see migrants as victims withers in favour of the drug-dealing 
“black man”: “In the end we are left with a distorted bricolage masquerading as real-
ism” (Bigo 2000: 93 [emphasis in original]). The perception of these threats and the 
increased policing efforts are “not a reflection of an increase in the threats facing mod-
ern society. Rather it is a lowering of the threshold of threat acceptance maintained by 
social controllers in tandem with the upsurge in the use of police methods themselves” 
(Bigo 2000: 83).
Sheptycki here uses the notion of the “folk devils”, the construction of a diffuse 
bogeyman who stirs up fears among the population and makes the police work appear 
natural, necessary and honourable. “Folk devils” might be socially constructed, but they 
are neither irrational nor mythical but rather “the product of definitional choice and in-
stitutional  thinking”  (Sheptycki  2002:  114).  Severe  border  controls  to  keep  out  un-
wanted intruders become the condition sine qua non for the preservation of an imagined 
European community: “For its part, the politics of border controls are located precisely 
at the point of intersection between issues of security and identity” (Walker 1998: 170). 
The European community is maybe not a cultural but a security community, 
weld together in the face of an external, and maybe already internal, threat. Especially 
in  the  context  of  the  Eastern  enlargement  and  Poland’s  expected  admission  to  the 
Schengen  area  the  question  of  the  balance  of  freedom  and  security  continues  to  be 
pressing within the framework of the European project.
Operational Motives – Poland
With EU membership, Poland has taken the first step towards full integration. In the 
case of the German-Polish border Poland rather fears the flow of crime through its terri-
tory than the influx. Poland’s status is that of a “gatekeeper“. The successful accom-
plishment of this assignment will be decisive for full membership among the Schengen 
countries. The members of the Schengen Agreements are under obligation to standard-
ise their visa regulations, to take part in the computerised Schengen Information Sys-
tem, and to improve the police and juridical cooperation between the member states. 
Thus Poland is anxious to meet the demands until the expected date in 2007. The Polish 
Eastern border, the new external border of the EU, is decisive here as it is rated by the 
EU as a particularly sensitive area (cf. Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
2002). Polish border police emphasise their increased responsibility as it is no longerResearch Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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limited to Polish home security but with EU accession has extended to the whole of 
Europe (StraĪ*UDQLF]QDQG³7KHTXDOLW\RIFRQWURODWWKHIXWXUH(8H[WHUQDOERrders 
will be thus decisive in maintaining a high level of internal security” (Vitorino 2002: 
13). Before Poland’s EU accession it was assumed that the new member states would be 
enthusiastic about the “return to Europe” and could be “expected to bring with them an 
intense commitment to making the EU work, as their best hope for overcoming their 
unhappy histories of marginalisation and oppression by dominant Great Power, socio-
economic stagnation, recurrent national tensions and political stability” (Amato 2002: 
9). This euphoria has been replaced by disillusionment, as especially in the new member 
states euro-sceptic and populist parties play a role that was not foreseen. Poland, in the 
first place, is not lacking in self-confidence and is not willing to be reduced to an enthu-
siastic junior partner. Poland’s claim to a leading role among the Eastern European 
states is strongly connected to that point. 
In order to be prepared for the full implementation of the Schengen acquis ad-
justment processes between the organisations are required. Processes of institutionalisa-
tion, like the standardisation of European security measures, have far-reaching homoge-
nising effects that likewise influence organisational practices on the actors’ level (cf. 
DiMaggio/Powell 1983). The progress of Poland’s integration into Europe, however, 
demands much more effort from the Polish than from the German side, since Poland has 
to equal a European standard that Germany, albeit with some exceptions like digital 
radio, has already achieved. The construction and adjustment of Polish border police 
buildings and equipment are to a large degree financed by the European Union. At the 
same time exchange and further vocational training measures take place under the over-
all control of Western Europe and the USA (cf. Schmitt 2003).
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From the viewpoint of the Schengen members Poland has to prove its capability 
to be a “good European”. The Polish efforts to meet these expectations are less derived 
from a desire to please the West but from the claim to become a full member in the 
Schengen area, to bear full responsibility and to operate at eye level with the “old” 
member states.
Cooperation on the micro level
The creation of a European security field calls for the frank cooperation of the countries 
involved. Trust is the basis for all police cooperation. The admission of the Eastern 
European countries into the EU is even more sensitive since they bear increased respon-
sibility for European internal security as the European external frontier has moved east-
wards (for trust and police cooperation s. Anderson 2002; Walker 2002).
Trust plays a major role also in border police cooperation. In earlier times Euro-
pean border security served not only to beat back criminal subjects but to protect the 
national territory from violation and observation by the potentially hostile neighbour 
country. Especially the latter function has changed in meaning due to the European in-
13  This  asymmetrical  relationship  to  a  greater  degree  exists  in  the  US-Mexican  police  cooperation: 
“United States law enforcement agencies are the dominant players in every instituted bilateral initiative 
with Mexico, even leading to the control of the organization of Mexican policing through training and 
logistic support” (Deflem 2004: 111).Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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tegration process; however there is a psychological factor in the sharing of responsibili-
ties for the security of one’s own state that proves relevant on the micro level. This be-
gins with the literal speechlessness during patrols on foreign territory, with possible 
implications for one’s own safety in dangerous situations, and ends with the fear to get 
in trouble because of a corruptible cooperator. German and Polish senior officers report 
that  it  was  not  easy  to  make  the  border  policemen  cooperate.  The  relationship  was 
marked  by  mistrust  and  prejudices  (for  German-3ROLVK VWHUHRW\SLQJ FI 'ąEURZVND
1999). In the course of the Eastern enlargement German border police officers felt de-
moted to “puppets on a string”, as they often say, as they no longer had the possibility to 
turn back Poles at the border. It seemed to them as if Poland tried to sneak from the 
“out-group” of the poor neighbours into the “in-group”, into the exclusive club of the 
EU. Polish border policemen on the other hand found themselves bluntly confronted 
with the Polish-German prosperity gap. 
Mistrust  and  prejudices,  however,  could  be  reduced  by  personal  contact,  the 
common identification by professional identity and the binding myth of the fight against 
crime. With the introduction of the joint control Germans and Poles together prevent the 
influx  of  crime;  after  all  the  poor  neighbour  has  moved  farther  eastwards  and  now 
comes from Russia or the Ukraine to the German-Polish border. 
However, successful cooperation on the level of the nation states and organisa-
tions does not automatically entail success on the level of personal interaction. If such 
different countries cooperate, then differences come into sight which cannot be simply 
reduced to equipment, but which are expressed in the organisational hierarchical struc-
ture, the institutional legacies, social and income cleavages, and not at least in commu-
nication problems. But such a combination of circumstances can also reinforce preju-
dices and asymmetries. I would like to illustrate this with an extract from my field di-
ary:
We are on a Polish-German patrol on the “Green Border”. Two Poles, 
two Germans and I drive around all day on the Polish side of the Odra. 
All of them have met before, for two of them it is their fifth patrol to-
gether. But actually it would be too much to say that they know each 
other, since none of them is able to speak the other’s language. All of 
them are happy to discover that I speak both German and Polish; hence 
they take advantage of me translating for them. The border police at the 
Green Border have virtually no contact with the other side apart from the 
patrols, so they are eager to learn about the others’ working and living 
conditions. Of course, the salaries have to be discussed. The Germans try 
to oppose the stereotype of them being well off by talking about high 
rents and gasoline and supermarket prices, but they are topped by the 
Polish enumeration. The whole conversation reveals much more differ-
ences than the Germans would have suspected, and for the Poles it is a 
depressing confirmation of what they had assumed: “Before the coopera-
tion we were quite sure that they earn much more than we do. But now 
we know that it is six times more. This knowledge really doesn’t make 
things any better.” The conversation switches to working conditions. The 
Germans  are  happy  to  find  a  common  feature,  as  both  Germans  and Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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Poles sometimes patrol along the river by bike. But the suspected com-
mon ground quickly disappears when both sides give a closer description 
of their respective bike patrols. While the Germans got new cool moun-
tain bikes, the Poles are ordered to ride some old ladies’ bikes, with the 
local population laughing their heads off when they see them passing by.
(Field diary, 25 October 2004)
Adjustments and structural reforms are necessary from both sides in anticipation of the 
full implementation of the Schengen acquis, but the way is longer for Poland than for 
Germany. The efforts to achieve the required standard are decisive for the interaction of 
border police from both countries. Even if both sides show good will, social, cultural, 
institutional and economic difference can impede understanding and revive supposedly 
overcome prejudices as “political and economic hierarchies also go hand in hand with 
continuing cultural asymmetries of superiority feelings and inferiority complexes and 
related ethno-national stereotypes” (Spohn 2002: 2).
Prospects
The nationally differentiated motives that surpass the overarching motif of the fight 
against cross-border crime and the securing of the European borders do not contradict 
but supplement each other. The positions of the border police organisations inside their 
nation states as well as the EU as a framework have created the structural conditions for 
cooperation. Moreover, an organisational myth binding for both border polices has been 
developed which acts as motivating basis around which cooperation crystallises. Thus 
the above-mentioned conditions for successful international cooperation are met.
These observations, however, can only indicate why cooperation can work. If, 
however, the analysis remains on the macro level, it cannot give an account of likely 
complications in daily practice of Polish and German border guards. Financial and tech-
nical imbalances relevant on the meso level are as much determining factors for interac-
tion as the prevailing social, cultural and work-ethical differences. The cooperation is 
characterised by dependency and inequality as almost all important impulses, financial 
means and instructions emanate from the Schengen countries. 
On the micro level social differences have to be diminished and the development 
of mutual trust has to be fostered in the first place. Stable and institutionalised coopera-
tion can only occur if the cooperation takes place on the same level. While this aim is 
pursued on the level of senior officers, bonds of trust among the lower ranks are delib-
erately prevented in order to hinder the development of stable groups.
Furthermore the European integration is a relevant factor for a reflection on the 
level of international and national cooperation beyond the status quo. Besides efforts to 
increase European border police cooperation, like the installation of a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Council of the 
European Union 2004a) in Warsaw, in this case Poland’s expected full implementation 
of the Schengen acquis is of importance. Poland is not only in a state of transformation 
itself, with far-reaching implications for the cooperation, but the border police work 
itself is in a state of transition and will undergo reorientation with the Schengen acces-Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
15
sion. From that moment on stationary border controls will be rendered obsolete and the 
securing of the border will be based solely on mobile controls.
14 In the long run Ger-
man-Polish border police cooperation in its present form is preparing its own abolition.
14 In special cases, like the 2006 football world championship in Germany, or demonstrations, where 
public order or national security might be endangered, the member states can decide to temporarily re-
sume border controls. Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 8
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